Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan by Barrera-Osorio, Felipe & Raju, Dhushyanth
Policy Research Working Paper 7307
Teacher Performance Pay
Experimental Evidence from Pakistan
Felipe Barrera-Osorio
Dhushyanth Raju
South Asia Region
Office of the Chief Economist
June 2015
WPS7307
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
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This paper presents evidence from the first three years of a 
randomized controlled trial of a government-administered 
pilot teacher performance pay program in Punjab, Pakistan. 
The program offers yearly cash bonuses to teachers in a 
sample of public primary schools with the lowest mean 
student exam scores in the province. Bonuses are linked 
to three school-level indicators: the gain in student exam 
scores, the gain in school enrollment, and the level of stu-
dent exam participation. Bonus receipt and size are also 
randomly assigned across schools according to whether 
or not the teacher is the school’s head. On average, the 
program increases school enrollment by 4.1 percent and 
student exam participation rates by 3.4 percentage points, 
both in the third year. The analysis does not find that the 
program increases student exam scores in any year. Mean 
impacts are similar across program variants. The posi-
tive mean impact on school enrollment is mainly seen in 
urban schools and the positive mean impact on student 
exam participation rates is only seen in rural schools. 
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I. Introduction 
Teacher effectiveness—a key determinant of school quality—is perceived to be poor in 
many low-income countries (Hanushek and Rivkin 2006, Glewwe and Kremer 2006). 
International development organizations increasingly promote performance (or incentive) pay to 
governments as an option to raise teacher effort and, thereby, teacher effectiveness.  
Some recent teacher performance pay ventures in low-income countries have been 
rigorously evaluated. These evaluated interventions serve as valuable proof-of-concept 
demonstrations but are “special” in character. Although largely administered in public schools, 
the evaluated interventions were often designed and administered by interested and capable 
NGOs, with significant guidance and oversight from outside researchers. In addition, data for 
administering the interventions were gathered by the researchers and partnering organizations. 
(See, for example, Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer 2010; Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012; 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011.) Hence, documented impacts may not be generalizable to 
other, different arrangements, such as where the government has overall primary responsibility 
for implementation (Bold, Kimenyi, Mwabu, Ng’ang’a, and Sandefur 2013). 
We evaluate the Improvers Bonus Program for Government School Teachers—a pilot 
public school teacher performance pay program conceived, designed, and managed by the 
provincial government of Punjab, Pakistan. The government is responsible for all aspects of the 
program and uses its own administrative data to assess teacher performance. While multiple 
international donor agencies provide financial and technical support to the government’s 
education reform agenda which includes the teacher performance pay program, the degree of 
external influence on the program does not differ from other, supported but unevaluated 
programs in the government’s reform agenda. Presumably, there is also less such influence than 
in the demonstrations we noted above.  
Our study contributes evidence on the effectiveness of teacher performance pay 
programs, which fall under the class of incentive-based, supply-side education interventions.1 
                                                 
1 Available rigorous evidence on the impacts of teacher performance pay is inconclusive: in some studies, there is 
consistent evidence of positive impacts (see, for example, Lavy 2002; Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012; Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman 2011; and Muralidharan 2012); in others, the evidence is mixed or conditional (see, for example, 
Glewwe et al 2010; Behrman, Parker, Todd, and Wolpin 2012; Sojourner, Mykerezi, and West 2014; and Fryer, Levitt, 
List, and Sadoff 2012; and yet in others, there is no evidence of positive impacts (see, for example, Fryer 2013; 
Springer et al 2011; and Goodman and Turner 2013).  
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More generally, our study contributes evidence on the effectiveness of public service delivery 
reform in a low-income setting where government capacity and accountability are considered to 
be poor. 
Initiated in mid 2010, the program offers yearly cash bonuses linked to school 
performance to public primary school teachers. At program registration, teachers are offered 
some basic school management, teaching, and exam preparation tips. The program is however 
designed to incentivize incumbent teachers to raise school performance by increasing their effort 
rather than by directly increasing their skill.2 
The bonuses are offered to teachers on top of their standard salaries, and are set as a 
linear function of a composite score of school performance. The composite score is obtained 
from a weighted sum of three indicators:  
 the gain in the school’s enrollment in first through fifth grade,  
 the gain in the school’s mean score on Punjab’s standardized fifth-grade 
examination, and  
 the participation rate of the school’s fifth-grade students in the examination.  
The first two indicators are consistent with the government’s main education goals: to raise 
school participation and student academic achievement. Participation and achievement are both 
acutely low in Punjab. The exam participation rate is included as a deterrent against potential 
exampool selection by program schools. The data for the indicators come from the Punjab 
Examination Commission (PEC) fifth-grade exam, which is a yearly standardized exam, and the 
Annual School Census (ASC) survey, which is a yearly field survey of all public schools. Both 
data instruments are administered by the government. 
Increasing the effort of head teachers may be an important way to raise school 
performance, and bonuses to head teachers may help elicit greater effort from them. Studies find 
                                                 
In spite of these mixed results, a few general patterns can be drawn from the collective evidence. Programs tend to 
have targeted schools with low baseline levels of student academic achievement. Program impacts are usually modest 
if present, but are large in a few cases. Programs in low-income countries have a higher success rate than those in 
high-income countries. Discussions of program implementation, in particular the fidelity and quality of 
implementation, are limited, if any. There is little or no rigorous evidence on, where relevant, the conditions and 
pathways behind intended (and unintended) impacts or the factors behind the lack of intended impacts. 
2 Growing credible evidence suggests the prevalence and severity of low teacher effort, of which two basic measures 
are whether the teacher is present in school and whether the teacher is on-task. Teacher absentee rates are found to be 
high in many low- and middle-income countries, and appear to result from many teachers being occasionally absent 
rather than a few teachers being frequently absent. When teachers are present in school, a large share of them are 
found to be off task (Glewwe et al 2010; Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers 2006).  
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that the performance of head teachers—as school leaders—is an important determinant of school 
performance (see, for example, Waters, Marzano, and McNulty 2003; Robinson, Claire, Lloyd, 
and Rowe 2008; Mulford 2003).3 Bonuses to head teachers may also be a more efficient way to 
raise school performance than providing bonuses to all teachers. To test whether leveraging head 
teachers is either sufficient or augments program impacts, the receipt and size of the bonus for a 
given level of school performance are randomly assigned across schools according to whether or 
not the teacher is the school’s head teacher.  
In the first treatment variant, head teachers are eligible for “level-1” bonuses, while other 
teachers are not eligible for any bonuses. In the second treatment variant, all teachers (whether 
head teacher or not) are eligible for level-1 bonuses. In the third and last treatment variant, head 
teachers are eligible for higher “level-2” bonuses, while other teachers are eligible for level-1 
bonuses. Level-2 bonuses are fixed to be twice as large as level-1 bonuses for a given level of 
school performance. The treatment variants and untreated status are randomly assigned across 
the evaluation sample of 600 public primary schools with essentially the lowest school-level 
mean 2010 PEC exam scores, located in three districts (out of Punjab’s 36 districts) with the 
lowest district-level mean 2010 PEC exam scores.  
Using the PEC exam and ASC survey data, we evaluate program impacts on school 
enrollment, exam participation rates, and student exam scores in the first three years of program 
implementation. Evidence of significant mean impacts across the three indicators is mixed. 
Significant positive mean impacts are concentrated in the third year. The program increases 
school enrollment by, on average, 4.1 percent in the third year. Treatment variants have 
similarly-sized third-year mean impacts, but only the impact for the treatment variant that offers 
bonuses solely to head teachers is significant. The program increases exam participation rates by, 
on average, 3.4 percentage points (ppts) in the third year. Given a baseline mean exam 
participation rate of 97 percent, the mean impact maximizes the rate. Treatment variants have 
similarly-sized third-year mean impacts, and all of them are significant. We do not find that any 
of the treatment variants, and hence the program, increases student exam scores in any year. 
                                                 
3 Factors that may drive a positive relationship between head teachers and school performance include “instructional 
leadership” (the ability to create an environment conducive for student learning), “transformational leadership” (the 
ability to motivate and empower teachers), and “managerial skills” (the ability to manage the school as a typical 
bureaucracy) (Boyd at al 2011, Ingersoll 2011, Grissom and Loeb 2011). High-performing school systems are often 
found to nurture, retain, and promote leaders in their teaching workforces as a core strategy for student learning (see, 
for example, Darling-Hammond and Rothman 2011 and World Bank 2011). 
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We test for two forms of strategic manipulation that could explain the mean impacts on 
school enrollment and exam participation rates. First, program schools may choose to reduce 
fifth-grade enrollment by limiting promotion to fifth grade or shedding fifth-grade students in 
order to raise their exam participation rates. We do not find consistent evidence across treatment 
variants that the program decreases fifth-grade enrollment. Second, program schools may choose 
to inflate reported enrollment. By constructing pseudo-panel cohorts using grade-specific 
enrollment information from the yearly ASC surveys, we test whether the program flattens the 
gradient at which enrollment declines with grade (or, more extremely, inverts it), which would 
be consistent with enrollment inflation. We do not find evidence suggesting this.  
Post-hoc subgroup analysis reveals that the third-year program mean impacts on school 
enrollment and exam participation rates vary between urban and rural schools. The program 
mean impact on enrollment in the total sample is mainly due to the urban subsample (which 
represents 8 percent of the total sample). The program increases enrollment in urban schools in 
the third year by, on average, 23 percent (the third-year mean impact in rural schools is 2 percent 
and insignificant). Looking at enrollment separately by grade, we find significant positive mean 
impacts of similar size in percent terms across first through fourth grade, indicating higher intake 
as well as higher retention. The program mean impact on exam participation rates in the total 
sample is fully due to the rural subsample. The program increases exam participation rates in 
rural schools in the third year by, on average, 3.6 ppts (the third-year mean impact in urban 
schools is –1.4 ppts and insignificant). Program mean impacts on student exam scores differ 
between the urban and rural subsamples in the first year but the differences in later years are not 
significant. 
Given that the program increases exam participation rates, we test whether the absence of 
significant positive mean impacts on student exam scores is due to negative selection of students 
into examtaking. We do not find evidence suggesting this. Apart from this test, we are left to 
speculate on factors that could have blocked impacts. We conclude the paper with this 
speculative discussion but, to summarize, we discount that the absence of positive mean impacts 
is due to program implementation failures. We also discount that it is due to bonus awards being 
too low, to the bonus formula being too complex for teachers to comprehend, or (as relevant for 
the treatment variant) to the group-based nature of the bonuses inducing significant freeriding.  
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We posit three hypotheses for the absence of positive mean impacts on student exam 
scores. First, nonschool or school factors outside the control of teachers may make raising 
student exam scores difficult even with greater teacher effort. Targeting schools with the lowest 
mean student exam scores in the province places the program in circumstances that may be 
especially handicapping. Second, teachers may lack the knowhow to raise student exam scores. 
Third, teachers may optimally choose to direct their effort at those incentivized margins that 
maximize payoffs net of effort costs. In this case, it appears that the net payoff-maximizing 
margin is school enrollment in urban areas, exam participation rates in rural areas, and not 
student exam scores anywhere.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the context and the 
program. Section III discusses the data, sample, and empirical strategy. Section IV reports the 
empirical results. In concluding, Section V summarizes the main results and discusses potential 
explanations for the absence of program impacts on student exam scores. 
 
II. Context and program 
A. Context 
Punjab, the site of the teacher performance pay program, is the largest of Pakistan’s four 
provinces, accounting for three-fifths of the country’s population and income. In 2012/13, the 
estimated net enrollment rate at the primary school level was 66 percent (2012–13 Pakistan 
Social and Living Standards Measurement [PSLM] survey report, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 
Government of Pakistan). In 2007, third-grade students in a school sample in rural Punjab 
scored, on average, 31 percent in English, 27 percent in Urdu, and 34 percent in mathematics on 
independently administered, competency-based tests. These results are significantly below 
official grade-level standards.4 
The public school system is the main provider of education in Punjab. In 2012–13, 61 
percent of primary school students were in public schools (2012–13 PSLM report, Pakistan 
Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan). The system is large, composed of 51,504 
functional schools. Seventy percent of these schools are primary schools (preschool to fifth 
grade) with 105,300 assigned teachers and 2.7 million children enrolled in first through fifth 
                                                 
4 Statistics provided by Jishnu Das. 
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grade (October 2013 Annual School Census, School Education Department, Government of 
Punjab).  
Available evidence indicates that teacher performance in public schools is poor. Using 
field survey data from rural Punjab, Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, Vishwanath, and Zajonc (2009) cast 
light on the performance of public school teachers, particularly when contrasted with teachers in 
low-cost, for-profit private schools operating in the same villages. They find that public school 
teachers tend to have higher levels of academic qualifications, teaching experience, and 
professional training than do private school teachers. Public school teacher salaries are, on 
average, three to four times higher than private school teacher salaries after accounting for 
differences in teacher credentials and other characteristics.  
Despite the higher levels of credentials among public school teachers, Andrabi et al find 
that the levels of teacher presence and student academic achievement are lower in public schools 
than in private schools. It also appears that public school teacher salaries do not vary with 
teacher competency (measured by teacher test scores) or student competency (measured by 
student test scores). Higher public school teacher salaries also seem to be associated with lower 
teacher effort, as measured by teacher presence at school. This pattern is driven mainly by the 
relatively lower presence of more senior (and, therefore, better paid) teachers in public schools. 
In contrast, among private school teachers, higher salaries are associated with higher teacher 
presence, higher teacher test scores, and higher student test scores.  
  
B. Program  
The teacher performance pay program was designed and approved by the Punjab 
government in fiscal year (FY) 2009–10 for implementation on a pilot basis starting in FY2010–
11 (corresponding to the 2010–11 school year).5 The main expressed aim of the program is to 
raise school performance by encouraging greater teacher effort. 
 
Measuring school performance 
The government selected performance indicators which could be measured regularly, 
throughout the province, in a standardized way across schools, and for which the underlying data 
                                                 
5 The government’s fiscal year begins on July 1 and ends on June 30.  The public school system’s school year begins 
on April 1 and ends on March 15.   
8 
 
were considered least susceptible to manipulation by schools. The government possessed two 
data sources that fulfilled these criteria: the Annual School Census (ASC) surveys and the Punjab 
Examination Commission (PEC) exams.  
Initiated in 2003, the ASC is an annual field survey of public schools which captures 
basic school and teacher information, including student enrollment by grade and gender, with a 
reference date of October 31. Initiated in 2006, the PEC exam is an annual, standardized 
academic test which is mandatory for public school students in fifth and eighth grades. The test 
uses selected and constructed response questions based on standard learning objectives of 
Pakistan’s official curriculum. Core subjects are English, Urdu, Islamic studies, mathematics, 
science, and social studies, all assessed through pencil-and-paper tests.  
The provincial education department is responsible for managing all stages of the ASC 
survey and PEC exam activities, and is solely responsible for the design of the data collection 
instruments. At the field level, Monitoring and Evaluation Assistants (MEAs) visit assigned 
public schools in November to collect ASC survey data. The MEAs are mostly retired members 
of the armed services and report directly to the provincial education department. The fifth-grade 
PEC exam is administered in January and/or February by district education department staff and 
enlisted public middle and high school teachers. Public middle and high schools serve as exam 
centers. Filled-in multiple choice scoring sheets are dispatched to PEC headquarters to be read 
by optical mark readers. Answers to open-ended questions are scored by recruited public middle 
and high school teachers at grading centers in the district; the scores are transmitted to PEC 
headquarters.  
The provincial education department selected three indicators for measuring school 
performance using the ASC survey and PEC exam data:  
 the gain in mean exam scores (GTS),  
 the gain in enrollment in first through fifth grade (GSE), and  
 the exam participation rate (TPR).  
GTS is defined as the year-over-year gain in the school’s percent mean score in the fifth-grade 
PEC exam. The indicator is measured in percentage point terms. The exam scores used by the 
government for the indicator were raw scores—the number of exam questions answered 
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correctly—for the multiple choice question modules in the core subjects.6 GSE is defined as the 
year-over-year gain in the school’s enrollment in first through fifth grade captured in the ASC 
survey. The indicator is expressed in percent terms. TPR is defined as the number of students 
who took the fifth-grade PEC exam from a school (recorded by PEC) divided by the number of 
enrolled students in fifth grade in the school (captured in the ASC survey). The indicator is 
expressed in percent terms. The values for each of the three indicators are bounded by zero 
percent and 100 percent.  
A composite school performance score (CS) was formulated as follows: 
0.65 0.25 0.15 .CS GTS GSE TPR   (1) 
The assigned weights reflect the provincial government’s relative valuation of the three 
indicators in assessing school performance. 
 
Targeting 
The program is targeted at public primary schools with among the lowest mean student 
exam scores in the province following a three-step process. First, the three districts with the 
lowest district-level mean scores in the 2010 fifth-grade PEC exam in Punjab’s 36 districts were 
selected. These districts were Attock, Mandi Bahuaddin, and Rahimyar Khan. Second, within 
these districts, schools at the primary level that were functional according to the October 2009 
ASC survey and had at least ten students who took the 2010 fifth-grade PEC exam were 
identified. Third, 1,962 such schools were ranked from highest to lowest by their 2010 school-
level mean fifth-grade PEC exam scores; the lowest ranked 600 schools were selected for the 
evaluation sample. The range of mean scores for the sample corresponds to that of 12 percent of 
all public primary schools in the province.  
 
Treatment variants 
In principle, the teacher assigned to be (acting) head teacher is authorized by the district 
education department to manage the school and its teachers. Head teachers can manage teachers 
by supervising, rewarding, sanctioning, and supporting teachers. If head teachers are a 
                                                 
6 Raw scores are used instead of the scores scaled by PEC because of concerns related to the conversion formula that 
is applied. The scoring of answers to multiple-choice questions is considered more reliable than the scoring of answers 
to open-ended questions. 
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sufficiently effective instrument for managing teachers and their performance, offering bonuses 
to head teachers may be a more efficient way to raise school performance than offering bonuses 
to all teachers in the school. 
These views shaped the design of three alternative treatment variants to test in parallel. 
Bonus eligibility and size were varied according to whether or not the teacher is the school’s 
head teacher.7 The treatment variants are:  
 HT only: only head teachers were eligible for level-1 bonuses.  
 all T: both head teachers and teachers were eligible for level-1 bonuses.  
 HT+: head teachers were eligible for level-2 bonuses, while other teachers were 
eligible for level-1 bonuses.  
The size of the level-2 bonus was set as twice the size of the level-1 bonus for a given level of 
school performance. Treatment variants and untreated status are randomly assigned across the 
evaluation sample by first blocking schools into quads based on 2010 school-level mean fifth-
grade PEC exam scores.8 
 
Bonus formula 
Table 1 presents the bonus formula, by treatment variant and teacher type (head teacher 
or other teacher). The slope parameters in the bonus formula were calibrated so that teachers in 
the average school at baseline in the evaluation sample face high-powered incentives to perform. 
Even if the average school does not increase enrollment and mean student exam scores but 
maintains its baseline exam participation rate of 97 percent, the minimum teacher bonus payout 
would be 14,550 Pakistani rupees (US$169).9 If the average school maxes out the composite 
score in the first year, the minimum teacher bonus payout would be 86,200 Pakistani rupees 
(US$1,002).10 These two minimum payouts represent 10 and 57 percent respectively of the 
                                                 
7 A teacher appointed as a head teacher on an acting basis is considered eligible for the head teacher bonus. A (head) 
teacher whose assignment to a program school is effective at the start of the school year is considered eligible for the 
(head) teacher bonus even if the (head) teacher is then transferred at any point during the school year to any another 
school. 
8 The trial is unmasked: the experimental groups that schools are assigned to are known by the provincial and district 
education departments, program implementing partners, supporting international donor agencies, and us (the 
researchers).  Program schools are directly made aware of their assigned treatment variant. 
9 We use the December 2010 exchange rate of 86 Pakistani rupees per US dollar.  
10 Maxing out the composite score in the first year would imply raising the exam participation rate from 97 to 100 
percent, doubling enrollment from 100 students, and raising the school mean exam score from 23 to 100 percent.  
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yearly basic salary of an average teacher at baseline in the evaluation sample.11 The percentages 
would be two-thirds to one-half their size if we instead use take-home pay (basic pay plus cash 
benefits) as the base.12  
 
Implementation 
In each of the three program years (FY2010–11, FY2011–12, and FY2012–13), staff 
from the provincial education department and partnering organizations conducted a field visit in 
the middle of the school year. During this visit, program school teachers were invited to attend 
meetings, separately by treatment variant-specific, proximity-based school groupings.  
The main aim of the meetings was to acquaint teachers with their relevant treatment 
variant and register them for the program. To register, the teacher filled in a form providing 
employment details and bank account information. The meetings were also used to facilitate 
experience sharing between teachers and to offer some tips for basic school and class 
management, teaching, and exam preparation.  
At the end of the first and second program years (two months after the end of the school 
year), school performance score cards were sent from the provincial education department to the 
district education departments. The score cards reported the school’s GTS, GSE, TPR, and CS 
values for the school year that just ended. The district departments were instructed to dispatch 
the cards to program schools and to have them displayed in a prominent, open location on school 
premises. These cards were printed on large, durable (synthetic flex) paper.  
At the end of the third program year, the provincial education department and partnering 
organizations held meetings with program school head teachers and directly handed them score 
cards (with a new format) to take back and display at their schools. This round of meetings was 
also used to facilitate experience sharing between teachers and to reiterate offered tips.  
In each program year, school performance scores and bonus awards were calculated by 
the provincial education department, with technical support and quality control by partnering 
organizations. The bonus awards, aggregated up to the district level, were communicated to the 
                                                 
11 The average teacher is at pay grade 9 and has 17 years of government service. The 2011 pay schedule for the 
Government of Pakistan indicates that an official at this pay grade and with this service length would earn a yearly 
basic salary of 151,920 Pakistan rupees (US$1,767).   
12 Government school teachers receive multiple monthly cash benefits (or “allowances”) for, among other things, 
transportation, medical, and housing expenses, and cost-of-living relief. 
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provincial finance department. The provincial finance department transferred the requested total 
bonus award for a district to an account dedicated to the program operated by the district 
education department. At the same time, the provincial education department sent the district 
education department a list of program schools and teachers with the bonus award and the 
personal bank account information of program school teachers.  
Provincial government and third-party validations find that program implementation has 
been generally satisfactory since the first year of implementation. 
 
Comparison with advocated best practice 
The program’s design takes account of key considerations and issues discussed in the 
literatures on optimal incentive contracting and incentive pay (see, for example, Neal 2011 for a 
review of performance pay in education) in at least four ways. First, the program’s piece-rate 
bonus structure arguably incentivizes efficient effort from teachers who may differ in their level 
of skill. Second, the program links bonuses to the exam participation rate to protect against 
teachers’ selecting academically-stronger students to register and take the exam. Indeed, high-
stakes accountability and performance pay programs are often documented to result in gaming 
(see, for example, Figlio and Winicki 2005 and Jacob and Levitt 2003). Third, in two of the three 
treatment variants, the program offers school-level group bonuses which can help prevent 
perceptions of unfairness and unproductive competition between teachers in the same school, 
although group bonuses can create a freerider problem (Holmstrom 1982; Cohn, Fehr, 
Herrmann, and Schneider 2013). Fourth, the program attempts to avoid a potential multitasking 
problem (Baker 1992, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). The program links bonuses to changes in 
school-level mean student exam scores to incentivize program school teachers to exert effort 
across all students and perhaps greater effort on relatively weaker students with more room to 
improve as well as incentivizes all program schools (irrespective of their baseline mean exam 
scores) to raise their performance (Barlevy and Neal 2012).13 The program also links bonuses to 
student exam scores from the five core subjects in the country’s curriculum to avoid teachers’ 
shifting their effort to a narrow set of incentivized subjects (Jacob 2005, Koretz 2002). 
                                                 
13 This structure contrasts with one that links bonuses to a minimum test score which can distort teacher effort towards 
students near the minimum test score or links bonuses to a minimum test pass rate which can discourage teacher effort 
in schools that are relatively farther away from the minimum test pass rate. 
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Nevertheless, the program’s design is imperfect in at least three ways. These 
imperfections, either singly or jointly, are not unique to this program. First, the program does not 
use teacher value-added measures which adjust gains in student exam scores for existing 
differences in relevant student and school characteristics (Koedel, Mihaly, and Rockoff 
forthcoming).14 Second, while the ASC survey and PEC exam data are used for both monitoring 
and accountability, the program makes these data more high stakes, increasing the risk that 
gaming and data manipulation undermine data reliability (even if this risk is limited to the 
relatively small sample of program schools). Third, gains in student exam scores may be due to 
teachers coaching students in examtaking strategies rather than teachers engaging in actions that 
produce actual student learning.15 
 
III. Data, sample, and empirical strategy 
A. Data and sample 
Four annual rounds of the ASC survey and PEC exam data were linked together using the 
government’s unique school identification codes (the Education Management Information 
System [EMIS] code). The October 2009 ASC survey and the January–February 2010 PEC exam 
rounds serve as our baseline data. (The program came into effect in July 2010.) The October 
2012 ASC survey and January–February 2013 PEC exam rounds serve as our data for the third 
program year.  
Evaluation sample schools were linked largely without issue across the various databases. 
We could not link a few schools because they were merged into other schools as part of Punjab’s 
school merger program.16 As a result, 583 schools (or 97 percent of the original evaluation 
sample) remain in the evaluation sample in the third program year. The shares of schools 
“attrited out” from the original evaluation sample do not differ between treated and untreated 
samples (2.7 percent versus 3.3 percent, respectively). 
                                                 
14 The use of value-added measures for teacher performance management is however contentious in education research 
and practice communities (see, for example, Goldhaber 2010).   
15 Neal (2011) argues that exam preparation can be defensible if performance pay shifts teachers from ineffective or 
lack of teaching—which presumably applies in our case (see Chaudhury et al 2006 for evidence from low- and middle-
income countries on teacher absentee and off-task rates)—to exam preparation than from effective teaching to exam 
preparation. 
16 Acquired schools lose their status as separate schools and are assigned the same EMIS codes as their respective 
acquiring schools. 
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Column 1 in Table 2 reports baseline mean outcomes and characteristics for schools in 
the original evaluation sample. Eight percent of schools are urban. Eighty-six percent of schools 
have buildings in satisfactory condition. On average, schools have 3.1 out of 4 basic amenities 
(drinking water, electrical connection, toilets, and sewer connection). On average, schools have 3 
teachers, with an average of 17 years of experience in government service and 10 years of 
service in their currently-assigned schools. Fifty-one percent of teachers have at most a high 
school diploma, 35 percent have a bachelor’s degree, and 14 percent have at least a master’s 
degree. On average, schools have 100 enrolled students in first through fifth grade, student-
teacher and student-classroom ratios higher than 50:1, and an exam participation rate of 97 
percent. School mean exam scores are standardized using the mean and standard deviation (sd) 
for school mean exam scores for untreated schools.  
We compare schools in the original evaluation sample to all public primary schools in the 
province. Column 2 in Table 2 reports baseline mean outcomes and characteristics for 42,438 
functional primary schools in the province (for ease, referred to as “all schools”) and Column 3 
reports differences in baseline means between evaluation sample schools and all schools.  
On average, evaluation sample schools were established earlier (+3 years). Evaluation 
sample schools are more likely to have buildings in satisfactory condition (+3 ppts); they have, 
on average, more classrooms (+0.4) and basic amenities (+0.3). Evaluation sample schools are 
just as likely to be urban as all schools, and less likely to be de-facto girls only (–15 ppts) and 
more likely to be de-facto coeducational or boys only. Teachers in evaluation sample schools are 
more likely to hold a bachelor’s degree than teachers in all schools (+11 ppts), and less likely to 
have completed high school (–9 ppts) or hold at least a master’s degree (–3 ppts).  
Evaluation sample schools are, on average, larger (+22 students in first through fifth 
grade, +7 students in fifth grade), and more crowded (+8.3 students per classroom, +11.9 
students per teacher). Finally, evaluation sample schools have, on average, higher exam 
participation rates (+4.4 ppts) and much lower exam scores (–4.2 sds). The last finding results 
from the way the evaluation sample is set. 
 
B. Empirical strategy 
The evaluation is based on a randomized block design. The 600 evaluation sample 
schools were randomly assigned into the four treatment statuses (HT only, all T, and HT+, and 
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untreated) of 150 schools each, after blocking by baseline school mean exam scores. This design 
ensures that any differences in mean outcomes between treatment statuses are attributable to 
differences in treatment statuses and not due to differences in baseline mean outcomes and 
characteristics between treatment statuses. 
We obtain mean impacts (specifically, intent-to-treat effects) by estimating via ordinary 
least squares an outcome regression of the form  
 
3
0 , ,0
1
,s i i s s d s
i
Y T X    

       (2) 
where sY denotes the outcome in school s, , ,  1,2,3,i sT i   treatment variant indicators 
(corresponding to treatment variants HT only, all T and HT+), ,0sX  baseline characteristics, and 
d district indicators. We estimate alternative variants of (2). We estimate regressions where we 
pool the three treatment variants ( sT  equals one if the school is treated, and zero if untreated), as 
well as regressions where each treatment variant is included additively. We estimate separate 
regressions for each program year. Regressions for enrollment and exam participation rates are at 
the school level and estimated standard errors are clustered at the tehsil (sub-district) level; 
regressions for exam scores are at the student level and estimated standard errors are clustered at 
the school level.17 
Table 2 reports baseline mean outcomes and characteristics for the original evaluation 
sample, separately by pooled treatment status (treated schools in Column 4 and untreated schools 
in Column 5), and differences in means between treated and untreated schools (Column 6). With 
the exception of the de-facto gender type of the school and years of government service of the 
teacher, results of tests of pairwise differences in baseline means between treated and untreated 
schools are insignificant. Results of tests of joint differences in baseline means between treated 
and untreated schools for three groups of variables, namely school-, teacher-, and enrollment and 
exam score-related (Panels A, B, and C), are also insignificant.18 In sum, the results confirm that 
treated and untreated school samples are balanced at baseline.   
                                                 
17 The country has four tiers of government administration: province, district, tehsil, and union council. The lowest 
level of public school system administration is the tehsil. 
18 We also check balance between treated and untreated schools in baseline mean outcomes and characteristics for 
schools that remain in the evaluation sample in the third program year. This test is important because, as we will show, 
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IV. Results 
A. Program impacts 
Table 3 reports estimated mean impacts on school enrollment (Columns 1–3), exam 
participation rates (Columns 4–6), and student exam scores (Columns 7–9) in each of the three 
program years.  
First, with respect to school enrollment, mean impacts of the treatment variants either 
turn from negative to positive or are positive and grow in size over the three years. Third-year 
mean impacts are 3.9 students for HT only, 2.5 students for all T, and 5.8 students for HT+, and 
are not statistically different from each other. However, only the mean impact for HT only is 
significant. The pooled treatment has a significant mean impact of 4.1 students (baseline mean 
enrollment is 100 students).  
Second, with respect to exam participation rates, mean impacts of the treatment variants 
also either turn from negative to positive or are positive and grow in size over the three years. 
Third-year mean impacts are 3.4 ppts for HT only, 2.8 ppts for all T, and 3.6 ppts for HT+, and 
are not statistically different from each other. The mean impacts for all treatment variants are 
significant. The pooled treatment has a significant mean impact of 3.3 ppts. Given a baseline 
exam participation rate of 97 percent, the mean impact maximizes the rate. 
Third, with respect to student exam scores, mean impacts of the treatment variants do not 
exhibit a monotonic pattern of change over the three years. Only treatment variant HT+ has 
consistent positive mean impacts of .09, .14, and .05 sds in the first, second, and third years, but 
they are all insignificant. Mean impacts across the years for the other two treatment variants are 
also all insignificant. The pooled treatment has mean impacts of .02, .08, and –.02 sds in the first, 
second, and third years, but they are all insignificant.  
 
Potential strategic manipulation of enrollment data 
The significant positive mean impacts on school enrollment in the third year may be due 
to program schools inflating enrollment. While schools do not have direct control over ASC 
                                                 
we find significant mean impacts mainly in the third year. Results from pairwise and joint tests suggest that baseline 
means do not differ between treated and untreated schools in the attrited sample.  
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survey data, MEAs capture enrollment figures from school enrollment registers, which are under 
the control of schools.19  
Children mainly join public primary schools in preschool and first grade; re-entrants or 
transfers into higher grades are rare and dropouts much more frequent. Hence, we expect that 
enrollment in grade g  in year y  is equal to or less than enrollment in grade 1g   in year 1y  . 
Enrollment inflation in year y  can flatten or invert this gradient. We test for this by estimating an 
OLS regression of the form 
  ,3, 0 1 ,3 , 2 ,3 , 3 ,3,1 2 ,  g s g t t s s g t t s g s g sE E T E t                   (3) 
where ,3,g sE denotes enrollment in grade g  in the third program year in school s , sT  the pooled 
treatment indicator, ,3 ,sg t tE    enrollment in grade g t  in program year 3 t  in school s , where 
t  denotes a one-year  1t   or two-year split  2t  ,  1 2t   an indicator for a two-year time 
split, g  grade g  indicators, and s  school indicators. A positive 1  is taken to indicate inflation 
in untreated schools and a positive 2  the differential inflation in treated schools. We find 
1
ˆ .53     .000p   and 2ˆ .03     .703p  . Thus, we do not find evidence consistent with 
potential enrollment inflation. 
 
Potential strategic manipulation of exam grade size 
Increased exam participation rates may be due to more fifth-grade students taking the 
exam (an increase in the fraction’s numerator) or to fewer fifth-grade students (a decrease in the 
fraction’s denominator), or to both. Exam grade size can decline if teachers hold back students in 
earlier grades or if teachers expel fifth-grade students (although the bonus’s link to school 
enrollment would deter such behavior).20 Evidence of a negative mean impact on fifth-grade 
enrollment would be consistent with strategic manipulation of exam grade size by program 
school teachers.  
                                                 
19 The provincial education department reports that MEAs crosscheck school enrollment figures against the actual 
presence of students but specific written guidelines are not provided. 
20 Holding back or expelling academically-weaker students can provide the added benefit of higher student exam 
scores. 
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Table 4 reports estimated mean impacts on fifth-grade enrollment in each of the program 
years. Mean impacts are negative for each of the treatment variants and the pooled treatment in 
the third year. However, only the mean impact for HT only of –1.1 students (or –6 percent given 
a baseline mean fifth-grade enrollment of 18.3 students) is significant. The pooled treatment’s 
mean impact of –.8 students is insignificant. Thus, we find inconsistent evidence of strategic 
manipulation of exam grade size by program schools.  
 
Potential negative selection into examtaking 
We find that the program increases exam participation rates in the third year. If the 
program induces weaker students to participate in the exam, the mean impact on student exam 
scores will be biased downwards.  
Adopting the approach by Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006), we re-estimate mean 
impacts on student exam scores by fitting a Tobit model to the data, artificially censoring the 
student exam score distribution at selected alternative low percentiles. All exam takers with 
scores below the censoring percentile are assigned the score at the censoring percentile. 
Assuming that (the few) exam nontakers would have scores below the artificial censoring point if 
they had taken the exam, exam nontakers are also assigned the score at the censoring percentile. 
Recall that mean impacts on student exam scores estimated via ordinary least squares (reported 
in Table 3) are insignificant. If mean impacts estimated via Tobit are positive and significant, it 
suggests that negative selection into examtaking may be behind the least squares results.  
Table 5 reports third-year mean impacts on student exam scores estimated via Tobit at 
four different censoring percentiles: 5th, 10th, 15th, and 20th. Mean impacts for the treatment 
variants, and the pooled treatment, are largely stable across the four censoring percentiles and are 
all insignificant. Thus, we do not find evidence of potential negative selection into examtaking. 
 
B. Program impacts by location 
In post-hoc subgroup analysis, we examine whether mean impacts vary by school 
location.21 Location is defined as whether the school is urban or rural. Only 48 schools (or 8 
                                                 
21 We also examine whether mean impacts vary by baseline mean exam scores, and find that they generally do not. 
Results are available upon request.   
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percent) are in the urban subsample, and, hence, the analysis of their mean impacts may be 
underpowered.  
Table 6 reports baseline mean outcomes and characteristics for urban and rural schools 
(Columns 1 and 2), and pairwise differences in means between the two subsamples (Column 3). 
Compared to rural schools, urban schools have a higher mean number of school amenities (+.3 
out of 4 amenities), mean number of teachers (+2.3 teachers), mean number of students in first 
through fifth grade (+40.2 students), mean number of students in fifth grade (+6.7 students), 
mean years of government service for teachers (+3.4 years), and mean exam scores (+.4 sds). 
Urban schools also have a lower mean student-teacher ratio (–18 students per teacher) than rural 
schools.  
Table 6 also reports differences in baseline mean outcomes and characteristics between 
treated and untreated schools in the urban and rural subsamples (Columns 4 and 5). Treated and 
untreated schools differ in two dimensions in the urban subsample and one dimension in the rural 
subsample. The differences in means, when present, are large: the share of schools with 
buildings in satisfactory condition is 18.4 ppts lower in treated than in untreated schools in the 
urban subsample; the share of coeducational schools is 11.2 ppts lower in treated than in 
untreated schools in the rural subsample. Nevertheless, we cannot reject that the differences in 
means are jointly equal to zero for our school-, teacher-, and enrollment and exam score-related 
groupings of dimensions (Panels A, B, and C) in the urban and rural subsamples. 
We test for differential mean impacts between urban and rural schools by estimating an 
OLS regression of the form 
 0 1 2 3 ,0 ,s s s s s s d sY T U TU X               (4) 
where sU  denotes whether or not the school is urban, and all other variables are as defined 
previously in (2). The mean impact for rural schools is given by 1 , the differential mean impact 
for urban schools by 3 , and the net mean impact for urban schools by 1 3   .  
As before, we estimate alternative variants of (3). We estimate regressions (a) where the 
three treatment variants are pooled, (b) where the treatment variants are included additively, and 
(c) separately for each of the three program years. Regressions for enrollment and exam 
participation rates are at the school level and standard errors are clustered at the tehsil level; 
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regressions for exam scores are at the student level and standard errors are clustered at the school 
level.  
Table 7 reports estimated differential mean impacts by school location. Mirroring the 
findings for the overall evaluation sample, significant mean impacts are concentrated in the third 
year. First, with respect to school enrollment, third-year mean impacts for the urban subsample 
relative to the rural subsample are an additional 34 students for HT only, 27 students for all T, 
and 29 students for HT+, but are significant only for HT only and all T. The pooled treatment has 
a significant third-year mean impact on enrollment of an additional 30 students in the urban 
subsample. The pooled treatment’s net third-year mean impact in the urban subsample is 32 
students (or 23 percent given a baseline mean enrollment of 137 students in urban schools).  
Second, with respect to exam participation rates, third-year mean impacts in the rural 
subsample are 3.7 ppts for HT only, 3.0 ppts for all T, and 4.2 ppts for HT+, and are all 
significant. The third-year net mean impacts of the treatment variants in the urban subsample are 
all negative and insignificant. The pooled treatment has a significant third-year mean impact of 
3.6 ppts in the rural subsample (and an insignificant third-year net mean impact of –1.4 ppts in 
the urban subsample). 
Third, with respect to student exam scores, third-year (differential) mean impacts of the 
treatment variants and the pooled treatment are insignificant for the rural (urban) subsamples. 
The pooled treatment however has a significant first-year differential mean impact of .34 sds in 
the urban subsample. While the corresponding mean impacts are .37 sds for HT only, .29 sds for 
all T, and .34 sds for HT+, only the impact for HT only is significant. 
We do not find that the differential mean impact on school enrollment for the urban 
subsample is due to enrollment inflation. Nor does it appear that the mean impact on exam 
participation rates for the rural subsample is due to manipulation of exam grade size. We check 
third-year means of basic school and teacher characteristics for treated and untreated schools 
separately for the urban and rural subsamples. In each subsample, the means are largely similar, 
thus failing to suggest potential pathways behind detected impacts.22  
Lastly, we examine how the third-year mean impact on school enrollment in the urban 
subsample is spread across grades. Table 8 reports estimated differential mean impacts of the 
                                                 
22 Results for the two tests of potential strategic behavior and the estimated third-year means of basic school and 
teacher characteristics are available upon request. 
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pooled treatment on grade-specific enrollment by school location. Depending on the grade, 
differential mean impacts for the urban subsample turn from negative to positive or are positive 
and grow in size over the three years. The third-year differential mean impact in the urban 
subsample is 12 students in first grade, and declines monotonically by grade to 1.9 students in 
fifth grade. As a percentage of baseline mean grade-specific enrollment in urban schools, the 
differential mean impacts across grades are similar in size. The third-year differential mean 
impacts are significant for all but fifth grade. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Most evaluations of teacher incentives in low- and middle-income countries can be seen 
as efficacy trials. This study reports findings from an effectiveness trial in a low-income setting, 
where, in contrast to the efficacy trials, the government was responsible for the design and 
implementation of a teacher performance pay program in public primary schools, including using 
their own administrative data for measuring performance. Monetary bonuses provided to 
teachers were linked to gains in school enrollment; to gains in school mean scores in a fifth-
grade standardized exam; and to the level of participation in the exam by fifth-grade students. To 
test whether leveraging head teachers either suffices or further augments program impacts, the 
receipt and size of the bonus were also randomly assigned across schools according to whether 
or not the teacher was the school’s head teacher.  
Looking at the first three years of implementation, and using the government’s program 
administrative data for the evaluation, we find mixed evidence of significant mean impacts on 
school enrollment, exam participation rates, and student exam scores. Significant positive mean 
impacts are concentrated in the third year. The program raises school enrollment and exam 
participation rates in the third year. The trends in impacts over the three years however suggest 
possible learning by teachers on how to respond to the program or possible growing confidence 
among teachers in the administration and continuation of the program. We do not find that the 
program raises student exam scores in any year. Inference results for the program as a whole are 
mirrored by each of the treatment variants in the case of exam participation rates and mean 
student exam scores and by the treatment variant that offers bonuses solely to head teachers in 
the case of school enrollment. Post-hoc subgroup analysis reveals that the third-year program 
mean impacts on school enrollment and exam participation rates in the total sample are driven by 
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the urban and rural subsamples, respectively. Program mean impacts on student exam scores 
differ between the urban and rural subsamples in the first year but the differences in later years 
are not significant. 
Given that the program increases exam participation rates, we test whether the absence of 
significant positive mean impacts on student exam scores is due to negative selection of students 
into examtaking. We do not find evidence supporting this hypothesis. Aside from this test, we 
are left to speculate on factors that could have blocked impacts. Some studies argue or show that 
implementation failures can explain the lack of program impacts.23 We discount that the absence 
of positive mean impacts on student exam scores is due to this problem. Third-party validations 
indicate that the program has been implemented satisfactorily, and markedly better than many 
other programs administered by the provincial education department. Program registration and 
orientation, the distribution of school performance score cards, and the transfer of bonus awards 
to teacher bank accounts were carried fully and in a timely and efficient way. The PEC exam and 
ASC survey activities were also carried out as scheduled. Credibility in the program was 
reportedly low in the first year of implementation: program school teachers conveyed that they 
were initially skeptical that they would receive bonuses (consistent with program rules). This 
skepticism appears to have faded away after program school teachers experienced how the 
government performed in running the program and they received their bonus awards. 
We also discount that the absence of positive mean impacts on student exam scores is due 
to bonus awards being too low, the bonus formula being too complex for teachers to understand, 
or the group-based nature of the bonuses (in the case of the two treatment variants that offer 
bonuses to all teachers) inducing significant freeriding. The mean bonus payout was 16 percent 
of the yearly basic salary for a teacher at the baseline mean pay grade and with baseline mean 
years of government service.24 All definitions and data sources for bonus calculations were 
communicated by program administrators to program school teachers during school visits and at 
                                                 
23 For example, a new program may experience teething problems (see Bouguen, Filmer, Macours, and Naudeau 
2013). In such cases, positive impacts may only materialize well after program inception, when problems are 
effectively resolved. Separately, implementation performance may be sensitive to program implementer 
characteristics such as the implementer’s interest, commitment, capability, and effort (Allcott 2015), and governments 
may be more likely or have larger shortfalls in these characteristics relative to, for example, (certain types of) NGOs 
(Bold et al 2013). 
24 This relative size is several percentage points higher than, for example, the bonuses in teacher-incentive field 
experiments in India (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011) and Kenya (Glewwe et al 2010); both experimental 
evaluations find positive mean program impacts. 
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orientation meetings for every bonus round. Teacher bonuses are also linked to own-school 
performance only, and not, for example, to own-school performance compared to other 
schools—the latter formulation could introduce added complexity and uncertainty for teachers 
(Fryer 2013). The mean number of teachers in program schools at baseline was three. It is likely 
easier to effectively counteract any incentives for freeridership in such small schools than in 
larger schools with an identical bonus design (Goodman and Turner 2013). 
We posit three hypotheses for the absence of positive mean impacts on student exam 
scores. First, the binding constraint may be external to the link between teacher effort and 
student exam scores. Nonschool and school factors outside the control of teachers may make 
improving student exam scores difficult even with greater teacher effort. Although the public 
schools targeted by the program were those with the lowest mean student exam scores in the 
province, and thus have ample room for improvement, the targeting places the program under 
circumstances that may be especially handicapping. In the face of these external constraints, 
teachers may choose to withhold greater effort or see expended effort go to waste.  
Second, the binding constraint may be that teachers lack the knowhow to improve student 
exam scores, essentially blocking the link between teacher effort and student exam scores. 
Teachers may not know what exact strategies to pursue to raise student exam scores, and whether 
what they intend to pursue is the most efficient way to raise student exam scores. In the face of 
this uncertainty, teachers may withhold greater effort or misdirect their effort (Fryer 2013).  
Third, teachers may optimally choose to direct their effort at those incentivized 
margins—school enrollment, exam participation rates, and student exam scores—that maximize 
payoffs net of effort costs (Neal 2011). In this case, it appears that the net payoff-maximizing 
margin is school enrollment in urban areas, exam participation rates in rural areas, and not 
student exam scores anywhere. The extent to which movement on a given margin pays off would 
depend on how accurately movement is measured, and teacher effort would be sensitive to this 
(Baker 2002). Measurement error may be higher for student scores in PEC exams than 
enrollment information in the ASC surveys. Notwithstanding, if measurement error is large, PEC 
exam scores would be a highly imperfect measure of latent student academic achievement. The 
latter is one of the main targets of the program.   
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Table 1. Bonus formula by treatment variant and teacher type 
Bonus treatment 
type 
Number of 
schools 
Teacher type 
Head teachers (HT) Teachers (T) 
HT only 150 1,000 × CS 0 
T 150 1,000 × CS 1,000 × CS 
HT+ 150 2,000 × CS 1,000 × CS 
Control 150 0 0 
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Table 2. Baseline means 
  Variable 
Evaluation 
sample 
All schools 
Difference  
Treated Untreated 
Difference 
(1)–(2)  (4)–(5) 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
A. School related 
 School age 42.67 39.56 3.112***   42.65 42.75 –0.1 
  (17.90)  (29.67)  (1.10)    (18.05)  (17.50)  (1.61)  
 Urban 0.08 0.08 –0.002   0.09 0.06 0.027 
  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.02)    (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.02)  
 Girls-only 0.11 0.26 –0.150***   0.1 0.13 –0.024 
  (0.31)  (0.44)  (0.02)    (0.30)  (0.33)  (0.03)  
 Coeducational  0.51 0.43 0.084*   0.49 0.58 –0.091** 
  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.05)    (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.05)  
 Classrooms 3.19 2.75 0.432***   3.19 3.16 0.027 
  (1.63)  (1.68)  (0.17)    (1.64)  (1.60)  (0.12)  
 Building in satisfactory condition 0.86 0.84 0.027**   0.86 0.86 –0.002 
  (0.34)  (0.37)  (0.01)    (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.03)  
 Amenities index 3.09 2.79 0.302**   3.09 3.11 –0.018 
  (1.05)  (1.17)  (0.13)    (1.02)  (1.14)  (0.11)  
         
 H0 (Differences jointly zero), p-value       0.301 
 
B. Teacher related 
 Teachers 2.96 2.77 0.188   2.98 2.91 0.064 
  (1.66)  (1.81)  (0.12)    (1.70)  (1.53)  (0.12)  
 Years of government teaching service 17.27 17.03 0.242   17.52 16.54 0.979* 
  (7.04)  (7.34)  (0.56)    (7.18)  (6.59)  (0.54)  
 Years of service in current school 9.8 10.07 –0.266   9.84 9.69 0.142 
  (5.49)  (5.69)  (0.39)    (5.49)  (5.48)  (0.46)  
 Less than high school diploma 0.34 0.43 –0.094***   0.34 0.31 0.03 
  (0.34)  (0.37)  (0.03)    (0.35)  (0.34)  (0.03)  
 High school diploma 0.17 0.16 0.013   0.17 0.17 –0.001 
  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.02)    (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.02)  
 Bachelor’s (or equivalent) degree 0.35 0.24 0.111***   0.34 0.36 –0.018 
  (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.03)    (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.03)  
 At least a master’s degree 0.14 0.17 –0.030*   0.14 0.15 –0.008 
  (0.25)  (0.29)  (0.02)    (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.02)  
         
 H0 (Differences jointly zero), p-value       0.686 
 
C. Enrollment and exam scores related 
 Enrollment, grades 1 to 5 99.98 77.8 22.187***   100.16 99.47 0.691 
  (51.69)  (59.06)  (4.31)    (51.59)  (52.17)  (5.58)  
 Enrollment, grade 5 18.25 11.16 7.084***   18.4 17.79 0.604 
  (9.81)  (10.82)  (0.77)    (10.01)  (9.20)  (0.98)  
 Exam participation rate, grade 5 0.97 0.93 0.044***   0.97 0.98 –0.005 
  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.01)    (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.01)  
 Student-classroom ratio 52.48 44.16 8.323**   52.34 52.89 –0.548 
  (36.99)  (29.59)  (3.79)    (38.26)  (32.94)  (4.03)  
 Student-teacher ratio 56.07 44.15 11.924***   56.22 55.62 0.604 
  (36.72)  (28.36)  (3.90)    (36.96)  (36.13)  (4.22)  
 Mean exam scores (sds.) 0 4.18 –4.186***   –0.01 0 –0.005 
  (1.01)  (3.09)  (0.17)    (1.02)  (1.00)  (0.07)  
         
 H0 (Differences jointly zero), p-value       0.936 
         
  Observations 600 42,438 43,038   450 150 600 
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses in Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses in Columns (3) and (6). Estimated standard errors are clustered at the tehsil level. “All schools” is defined as all functional 
primary schools in Punjab. Baseline data are from the 2009 Annual School Census and the 2010 Punjab Examination Commission fifth-grade exam. 
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Table 3. Program impacts 
  
Enrollment (grades 1–5)  Exam participation rate (grade 5)  Student exam scores (grade 5) 
Program year 
1st  2nd  3rd  1st  2nd  3rd  1st  2nd  3rd 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  (7)   (8)   (9) 
Pooled T –1.587  –0.222  4.067*  –0.006  0.005  0.033***  0.016  0.078  –0.015 
 (1.40)   (1.32)   (2.39)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.07)   (0.08)   (0.09)  
Untreated group mean 93.77  87.61  83.73  0.950  0.920  0.940  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (48.98)   (48.03)   (45.57)   (0.10)   (0.11)   (0.12)   (1.00)   (1.00)   (1.00)  
R-squared statistic 0.882  0.812  0.711  0.093  0.072  0.065  0.111  0.165  0.149 
                 
Treatment variants 
HT only –1.564  –2.348  3.946*  –0.015  –0.015  0.034***  –0.004  0.047  –0.026 
 (1.31)   (1.91)   (2.02)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.09)   (0.10)   (0.11)  
All T 1.517  3.655*  5.794  –0.005  0.008  0.028*  –0.042  0.040  –0.077 
 (2.20)   (2.13)   (3.70)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.09)   (0.11)   (0.11)  
HT+ –4.667**  –1.889  2.531  0.000  0.023  0.036**  0.085  0.140  0.048 
 (2.04)   (2.28)   (3.66)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.09)   (0.10)   (0.10)  
R-squared statistic 0.884  0.814  0.711  0.095  0.084  0.066  0.113  0.166  0.151 
                  
H0 (HT only=All T), p-value 0.214  0.038  0.634  0.386  0.204  0.600  0.658  0.951  0.647 
H0 (HT only=HT+), p-value 0.192  0.879  0.654  0.147  0.062  0.790  0.342  0.380  0.467 
H0 (All T=HT+), p-value 0.009  0.094  0.461  0.609  0.230  0.462  0.168  0.382  0.249 
                  
Observations 598   593   583   597   591   575   9,030   8,085   8,211 
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors in the enrollment and exam 
participation rate regressions are clustered at tehsil level. Standard errors in the student exam score regressions are clustered at the school level. All regressions control for districts and 
baseline outcomes and characteristics.  
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Table 4. Examining potential strategic manipulation of exam grade size 
    
Enrollment, grade 5 
Program year 
1st  2nd  3rd 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Pooled T  0.128  –0.353  –0.766 
  (0.61)   (0.56)   (0.58)  
Untreated group mean  15.36  14.71  14.72 
  (9.74)   (9.50)   (9.67)  
R-squared statistic  0.72  0.678  0.673 
 
Treatment variants 
HT only  1.080**  –1.402***  –1.108*** 
  (0.53)   (0.53)   (0.40)  
all T  0.371  0.665  –0.448 
  (0.87)   (0.76)   (0.83)  
HT+  –1.054  –0.302  –0.743 
  (0.66)   (0.71)   (0.87)  
R-squared statistic  0.725  0.683  0.673 
 
H0 (HT only=all T), p-value  0.314  0.013  0.383 
H0 (HT only=HT+), p-value  0.002  0.055  0.690 
H0 (all T=HT+), p-value  0.038  0.242  0.673 
 
Observations   598   593   583 
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the tehsil level, are reported in parentheses. All regressions control for districts and baseline outcome and 
characteristics. 
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Table 5. Examining potential negative selection into examtaking 
Tobit mean impact estimates for student exam scores 
Treatment 
Censoring percentile 
5th 10th 15th 20th 
Pooled T –0.017 –0.014 –0.014 –0.014 
 (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  
 
Treatment variants 
HT only –0.025 –0.022 –0.021 –0.009 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  
All T –0.083 –0.081 –0.086 –0.092 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)  
HT+ 0.048 0.052 0.055 0.052 
  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the school level, are reported in 
parentheses. Student exam scores are standardized using the mean and 
standard deviation for students in untreated schools. All regressions control for 
districts and baseline outcomes and characteristics. 
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Table 6. Baseline means by location (urban versus rural) 
    
Urban Rural 
Difference 
  
Treated–untreated 
(1)–(2) Urban Rural 
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
A. School related 
 School age  42.96 42.65 0.312  5.419 –0.494 
   (21.07)  (17.62)  (2.84)   (5.27)  (1.55)  
 Girls-only  0.06 0.11 –0.05  –0.06 –0.021 
   (0.24)  (0.32)  (0.05)   (0.10)  (0.03)  
 Coeducational   0.50 0.51 –0.013  0.205 –0.112*** 
   (0.51)  (0.50)  (0.06)   (0.20)  (0.04)  
 Classrooms  3.70 3.14 0.562  0.181 0.002 
   (2.07)  (1.58)  (0.44)   (0.53)  (0.10)  
 Building in satisfactory condition  0.85 0.86 –0.013  –0.184*** 0.011 
   (0.36)  (0.34)  (0.04)   (0.04)  (0.03)  
 Amenities index  3.38 3.07 0.306**  –0.085 –0.022 
   (0.79)  (1.07)  (0.15)   (0.26)  (0.11)  
 
 H0 (all differences jointly zero). p-value      0.103 0.116 
 
B. Teacher related 
 Teachers  5.08 2.78 2.307***  1.06 –0.072 
   (1.96)  (1.50)  (0.41)   (0.80)  (0.14)  
 Years of government service  20.41 17.00 3.418***  –1.263 1.038 
   (4.77)  (7.14)  (0.96)   (1.92)  (0.65)  
 Years of service in current school  10.35 9.75 0.6  –2.201 0.288 
   (4.46)  (5.57)  (0.63)   (3.11)  (0.52)  
 Less than high school diploma  0.39 0.33 0.053  –0.160*** 0.042 
   (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.04)   (0.05)  (0.04)  
 High school diploma  0.20 0.17 0.025  0.051 –0.005 
   (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.03)   (0.05)  (0.03)  
 Bachelor’s (or equivalent) degree  0.30 0.35 –0.057  0.053 –0.021 
   (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.05)   (0.07)  (0.03)  
 At least a master’s degree  0.11 0.14 –0.034  0.062 –0.012 
   (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.03)   (0.04)  (0.02)  
 
 H0 (all differences jointly zero). p-value      0.123 0.598 
 
C. Enrollment and exam scores related 
 Enrollment, grades 1 to 5  136.96 96.77 40.188***  18.684 –1.709 
   (69.54)  (48.61)  (10.39)   (22.97)  (6.15)  
 Enrollment, grade 5  24.44 17.71 6.729***  2.453 0.285 
   (13.99)  (9.18)  (2.31)   (4.66)  (0.87)  
 Exam participation rate, grade 5  0.97 0.97 0.002  –0.004 –0.005 
   (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.01)   (0.02)  (0.01)  
 Student classroom ratio  62.09 51.65 10.447  10.587 –1.611 
   (52.13)  (35.32)  (8.13)   (14.71)  (4.47)  
 Student teacher ratio  39.48 57.52 –18.038***  1.406 1.072 
   (21.64)  (37.42)  (5.12)   (4.56)  (4.76)  
 Mean exam scores (sds.)  0.37 –0.04 0.411***  0.038 –0.02 
   (0.78)  (1.03)  (0.11)   (0.29)  (0.07)  
 
 H0 (All differences jointly zero). p-value      0.961 0.856 
 
  Observations   48 552 600   48 552 
Notes: .* denotes significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses in 
Columns 1 and 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses in Columns 3–5  
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Table 7. Program impacts by location (urban versus rural) 
  
Enrollment (grades 1 to 5)  Exam participation rate (grade 5)  Student exam scores (grade 5) 
Program year 
1st  2nd  3rd  1st  2nd  3rd  1st  2nd  3rd 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9) 
 Pooled T –1.77  –1.274  1.953  –0.006  0.007  0.036***  –0.014  0.077  -0.013 
  (1.48)   (1.16)   (2.35)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.09)  
 T×Urban (U) 2.681  15.24  30.429***  0  –0.028  –0.050***  0.339**  0.008  -0.023 
  (4.85)   (9.44)   (9.86)   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.16)   (0.25)   (0.31)  
 R-squared statistic 0.882  0.813  0.715  0.093  0.073  0.068  0.112  0.165  0.149 
 
Treatment variants 
 HT only –1.752  –4.093*  1.285  –0.012  –0.015  0.037***  –0.04  0.036  -0.052 
  (1.75)   (2.09)   (2.63)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.10)   (0.11)   (0.11)  
 HT only×U 2.696  21.285***  33.944***  –0.027  –0.009  –0.044**  0.374*  0.097  0.172 
  (6.17)   (7.64)   (9.69)   (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.21)   (0.30)   (0.34)  
 All T 1.524  3.208  4.051  –0.006  0.01  0.030*  –0.065  0.015  -0.05 
  (2.26)   (2.11)   (3.67)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.09)   (0.11)   (0.12)  
 All T×U –0.64  6.597  26.857***  0.009  –0.035  –0.027  0.293  0.338  -0.282 
  (7.14)   (5.59)   (8.09)   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.20)   (0.38)   (0.42)  
 HT+ –5.067**  –2.874  0.605  –0.002  0.025  0.042***  0.058  0.173*  0.051 
  (2.07)   (2.11)   (3.12)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.11)  
 HT+×U 5.564  15.796  29.251  0.029  –0.036  –0.077**  0.336  –0.349  -0.003 
  (9.17)   (19.42)   (21.18)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.28)   (0.30)   (0.36)  
 R-squared statistic 0.884  0.816  0.716  0.098  0.085  0.072  0.114  0.171  0.154 
 
Ho: ((HT only × U) = (All T×U)), p-value 0.722  0.038  0.491  0.596  0.455  0.383  0.732  0.544  0.215 
Ho: ((HT only×U) = (HT+× U)), p-value 0.809  0.774  0.842  0.283  0.493  0.25  0.905  0.172  0.597 
Ho: ((All T×U) = (HT+×U)), p-value 0.461  0.592  0.902  0.56  0.983  0.131  0.888  0.095  0.499 
 
Observations 598   593   583   597   591   575   9,030   8,085   8,211 
Notes: * denotes significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors in the enrollment and exam participation rate 
regressions are clustered at tehsil level; standard errors in the student exam score regressions are clustered at the school level. All regressions control for districts and baseline outcomes and characteristics.  
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Table 8. Program impacts on grade-specific enrollment by location (urban versus rural)  
 
 
Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4  Grade 5 
Program year 
1st 2nd 3rd  1st 2nd 3rd  1st 2nd 3rd  1st 2nd 3rd  1st 2nd 3rd 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) 
 Pooled T –1.095 0.543 2.257**  –0.278 –0.474 0.326  –0.637 –0.111 –0.541  –0.023 –0.805* 0.349  0.189 –0.246 –0.851 
  (0.69)  (0.60)  (1.01)   (0.82)  (0.51)  (0.51)   (0.54)  (0.60)  (0.43)   (0.63)  (0.44)  (0.60)   (0.63)  (0.56)  (0.70)  
 T×Urban (U) 4.001* 5.685** 12.032***  3.712 5.915* 7.353***  –2.389 4.472* 4.691**  –1.913 0.649 4.690**  –0.561 –1.505 1.846 
  (2.09)  (2.62)  (4.28)   (2.49)  (3.06)  (2.46)   (2.39)  (2.55)  (1.97)   (1.85)  (2.16)  (2.32)   (1.41)  (1.82)  (1.45)  
 R-squared statistic 0.593 0.598 0.452  0.758 0.641 0.552  0.753 0.702 0.625  0.728 0.72 0.673  0.719 0.681 0.671 
                     
Observations 600 599 597   600 599 597   600 599 597   600 599 597   600 599 597 
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors in the enrollment and exam participation rate regressions 
are clustered at tehsil level; standard errors in the student exam score regressions are clustered at the school level. All regressions control for districts and baseline outcomes and characteristics.  
 
